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whether the legislature intended, expressly or implicitly, to create or
deny such a remedy. Third, the court must conclude if the remedy was
consistent with the statutory scheme.
Finally, the court must
determine if the subject of the suit was one traditionally relegated to
state law, making a private federal enforcement action inappropriate.
The court decided that the WRDA benefited the general public,
but did not allow for a special class of users, i.e., riparians or treatyholders, to assert additional privileges or benefits. The WRDA gave
the Great Lakes states governors the authority to make decisions
collectively to protect the water and enforce the prohibition against
diversion and exportation of the resource. In bolstering deference to
the Great Lakes governors decision making, the court noted that
allowing private suits could frustrate any uniform policies or goals
implemented by the governors concerning conservation issues.
Additionally, the court pointed out the lack of "private right of action"
language and concluded the exclusion of the language was deliberate,
considering such private suit action verbiage exists in a recent
provision of the WRDA.
Completing the analysis set out above, the court found that private
suits were inconsistent with the statutory scheme, again alluding to
deference to the governors. The court agreed with the Tribes that the
subject of the suit falls under a federal interest, as opposed to state.
However, the court disagreed that the compelling interests revolved
around regulating Indian affairs. Instead, the court categorized tribal
rights as peripheral, and emphasized interstate commerce issues
associated with the Great Lakes.
Additionally, the court noted three fact situations where the
current legislative scheme might prove inadequate. As this case
demonstrated, what is to be done if the governors fail to take any
action when diversion or exportation of the Great Lakes occurs? A
second potential problem was the lack of an explicit enforcement
mechanism for the governors to use in supervising a wayward
governor. The third cause for concern was the lack of Congressional
delegation of authority to an officer in the executive branch to
intervene if a governor chose to act in a manner that served his/her
interests, but stood in opposition to federal interests in Great Lakes
waters.
Melissa L. Gordon

Am. Littoral Soc'y v. EPA, 199 F. Supp. 2d 217 (D.N.J. 2002) (denying
summary judgment for conservation groups alleging arbitrary and
capricious decision making because the Environmental Protection
Agency could demonstrate good cause for each of its decisions).
American Littoral Society ("Littoral") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey against the
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Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to compel it to implement
the Clean Water Act ("WA"), alleging that the State of New Jersey
("New Jersey") had failed to do so. The CWA delegated to the states
the primary responsibility for setting and achieving Water Quality
Standards ("WQS"). New Jersey set WQSs per the CWA, but failed to
identify areas not complying with those standards. It also failed to
establish guidelines for the amount of pollution a body of water could
absorb before failing WQS compliance. The court denied all of
Littoral's motions for summary judgment, but granted summary
judgment to EPA on the issue of failure to consult under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
Littoral's fifth amended complaint alleged violation of section
706(2) (A) of the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") due to
decisions that were arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. It also alleged violation of
section 706(1) of the APA due to unreasonable delay, and violation of
section 7 of the ESA for failure to confer with the Secretary of the
Department of the Interior, as an agency should when its action is
likely to jeopardize a species proposed for listing under ESA, or will
destroy or adversely modify its habitat.
Section 303(d) of the CWA requires states to identify areas that do
not or probably will not meet WQSs, even with effluent limitations and
other controls. States must then rank these areas by priority and
submit the resulting section 303(d) list to the EPA. Littoral argued
that NewJersey omitted sixty waters from the list, and that the EPA did
not have the authority to approve the list in its seemingly incomplete
state. The EPA answered that Littoral lacked standing and that
administrative records supported the EPA's decision to exclude those
waters. The court held that Littoral easily met the low threshold for
environmental plaintiffs seeking standing, but that the EPA had a
justifiable reason for every omission, and was therefore not arbitrary
and capricious in its decision to omit the waters from the section
303(d) list.
Littoral next alleged that EPA's omission of anti-degradation
waters from the list was arbitrary and capricious.
Federal law
mandated that all states adopt and implement antidegradation
standards to ensure water quality for existing uses. Waters, which fail
to meet WQS under section 303 of the CWA, must appear on states'
section 303(d)
lists.
along with
pertinent
antidegradation
requirements. Littoral argued that the absence of any such water on
New Jersey's section 303(d) list proved that New Jersey omitted all
waters failing the WQS. Because Littoral failed to specifically name a
single water of this description, the court rejected its argument and
held that the EPA's action was not arbitrary and capricious with
respect to anti-degradation waters.
Littoral followed with an allegation of constructive submission and
unreasonable delay. For most of the last decade, the EPA required
states to submit section 303(d) lists and establish total maximum daily
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loads and total maximum daily thermal loads (collectively "TMDL") in
every even-numbered year. NewJersey's failure to submit TMDLs, and
EPA's refusal to disapprove of this practice, constituted unreasonable
delay of agency action, according to Littoral.
To prove this
contention, Littoral needed to show "constructive submission" on New
Jersey's part by demonstrating that New Jersey neither submitted
TMDLs nor planned to remedy its non-compliance. The court held
that New Jersey had submitted some TMDLs and planned to remedy
its failure to comply. While hardly exemplary, New Jersey's record was
nonetheless sufficient for the EPA to prevail on the charge of
unreasonable delay.
The court held that Littoral's fourth count, regarding the EPA's
alleged failure to comply with section 7 of the ESA was moot, as events
had transpired which irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged
violation. By February 2001, the EPA had initiated consultations with
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine
Fisheries Service as mandated by the ESA. While the court recognized
that a narrow exception to the doctrine of mootness could exist in
cases where a wrong is capable of repetition but evades review, Littoral
failed to satisfy this two-prong test.
Curtis Graves
Baker Farms, Inc. v. Hulse, No. 5:01-CV-315-C, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6243 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2002) (holding a federal court lacks subject
matterjurisdiction in adjudicating claims involving a state's property
interests without the consent of that state).
Baker Farms ("Baker"), a Texas corporation, operated its farm and
livestock business on a 188-acre leased property in Floyd County,
Texas. A railway roadbed divided this property into north and south
parcels. In 1992, the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department ("TPWD")
purchased the railway roadbed and converted it into Caprock Canyon
State Park and Trailway ("Trailway") for public recreation. Baker
contacted Jeoffrey Hulse, Park Manager of the Trailway, regarding
Baker's right to access the water well located on the Trailway. Hulse,
along with employee Ronny Gallagher, refused Baker's effort to lay
new electric lines to access the well water.
Baker filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas against Hulse and others, seeking injunctive
relief prohibiting any further interferences with Baker's property
interests in the water well and crossway. In addition, Baker sought to
recover costs incurred in the drilling of an alternative water well on its
leased property, punitive damages totaling $100,000, and attorney's
fees. Defendants moved to dismiss the cause of action due to a lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted this motion and
dismissed the case without prejudice.

